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Abstract 
This paper describes technical progress made in the application of run time assurance (RTA) methods to 
turbofan engines with advanced propulsion control algorithms that are employed to improve engine performance.  
It is assumed that the advanced algorithms cannot be fully certified using current verification and validation 
approaches and therefore need to be continually monitored by an RTA system that ensures safe operation.  
However, current turbofan engine control systems utilize engine protection logic for safe combustion dynamics 
and stable airflow through the engine.  It was determined that the engine protection logic should continue to be 
used to provide system safety and should be considered as a part of the overall RTA system.  The additional 
function that an RTA system provides is to perform diagnostics on anomalous conditions to determine if these 
conditions are being caused by errors in the advanced controller. If this is the case, the RTA system switches 
operation to a trusted reversionary controller.  Initial studies were performed to demonstrate this benefit.  The 
other focus was to improve the performance of the engine protection logic, which was deemed too conservative 
and reduced engine performance during transient operations.  It was determined that the conservative response 
was due to poor tuning of one of the controller channels within the protection logic. An automatic tuning algorithm 
was implemented to optimize the protection logic control gains based on minimizing tracking error. Improved 
tracking responses were observed with no change to the existing protection logic control architecture.  
Nomenclature 
C-MAPSS40k  Commercial Modular Aero Propulsion System Simulation 40k 
CA  conditionally active DTA  design time assurance  
DTA’d  design time assured EPR  engine pressure ratio  
HPC  high pressure compressor IFT  iterative feedback tuning  
MBEC  model based engine control OTKF  optimal tuner Kalman filter  
PI proportional-integral PID  proportional-integral-derivative  
PLA  power lever angle PR  pressure ratio  
RTA  runtime assurance RTA’d  runtime assured  
SM  surge margin V&V  verification and validation  
Wf  fuel flow 
 
I. Introduction 
here is now wide interest in run time assurance (RTA) approaches for a number of safety or operational critical 
systems.  In recent years a number of national and international forums and conferences have emerged that are 
dedicated to software assurance and run time assurance topics and these meetings seem to be growing in size and 
importance, especially in the computer science and systems engineering fields.  Application specific industries are 
now recognizing the utility and benefits of RTA to realize inclusion of advanced and intelligent systems that would 
otherwise be too complex to certify for operational use. In general terms, an RTA system provides protection by 
continually monitoring the overall system’s state (or certain critical parameters) to determine if the system is operating 
correctly (in terms of safety and/or performance).  If the monitoring function determines that unsafe or off-nominal 
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conditions are ensuing due to undiscovered errors in the untrusted advanced system, then the RTA system activates 
one or more recovery actions to mitigate the adverse conditions and return operation to a safe/correct state.  
Because of the need to increase the operating performance of turbofan engines for new and future aerospace 
applications, there is currently wide interest in using more advanced control algorithms to achieve these new 
capabilities.  The current investigation is motivated by a number of recent advanced control approaches in the 
propulsion community to provide better performance over the life cycle of the engine [1,2].  However, it is recognized 
that certification of such advanced controllers may be difficult because of their inherent complexity with intelligent 
and possibly nondeterministic elements.  Exhaustive software testing used in current verification and validation 
(V&V) methods cannot cover the nearly infinite states that can be reached by such advanced algorithms.  RTA systems 
can hold the promise of providing safe engine operations under these types of advanced controllers and NASA Glenn 
Research Center is interested in the application of RTA methods to expedite the certification process.   
This paper presents an initial investigation of applying RTA protection to a particular turbofan engine model with 
an advanced control system.  General background on RTA systems is presented next in Section II, followed by 
discussion of applying RTA to the turbofan engine system in Section III.  Case studies demonstrating the benefits of 
the RTA system in determining faults in the advanced engine controller and subsequent mitigations are then presented 
in Section IV.  Next, work on improving the design of safety critical functions within existing engine protection logic 
is presented in Section V.  This logic is considered to be part of the overall RTA design.  Last, conclusions are drawn 
from the study in Section VI. 
II. General Background of RTA Protected Systems 
A. Fundamental Concepts and Definitions 
Key definitions and fundamental concepts of RTA systems are presented in this subsection.  Consider the 
following definitions: 
Trusted software: is a set of software that can be fully V&V’d to its defined required certification level [3,4,5] at 
design time (before live operation).  That is, there is an acceptable level of confidence that the software will operate 
correctly to the required certification level of the system within which it operates. The required certification level 
depends on the defined criticality of the software, which is determined by the level of hazardous effects that errors in 
the software can have on the plant (Level A – catastrophic, Level B,C – major/hazardous, etc., see [3,4]). 
Untrusted software: is a set of software that cannot be fully V&V’d to its defined required certification level (due to 
its complexity, nondeterminism, etc.). That is, there is not an acceptable level of confidence that the software will 
always operate correctly for any state that can be encountered during live operation of the plant.  Untrusted software 
is typical during developmental testing stages, in which full V&V analysis/testing would be schedule and cost 
prohibitive at that point in the design cycle. 
Design time assurance (DTA): is the process of performing V&V analysis and testing of software offline, at design 
time (again, before live operation) to the level required for certification of the plant or system the software is intended 
to operate on.  A design time assured (DTA’d) system or subsystem is one in which all its software components are 
trusted.     
Runtime assurance (RTA): is the process of monitoring a system containing untrusted software during runtime or live 
operation of the plant to determine if the untrusted software is operating correctly.  If it is determined that the untrusted 
software is not operating correctly or it is detected that anomalous or unsafe behavior is ensuing, then control is 
switched to trusted reversionary software. That is, the RTA system activates some type of recovery action to ensure 
continued safe or correct operations.  Note that the term “correct” implies that the software is performing as it is 
intended to, defined in some manner, such as by minimum performance requirements.  The presumption here is that 
the reversionary software has equivalent basic functionality as the untrusted software, but without all of the advanced 
features.   The reversionary software would be able to continue safe operation of the plant or system, but at a reduced 
level of performance, capability, or functionality.  In general, the reversionary software provides a “recover and return 
to base” capability.  In the literature, the reversionary system is often referred to as the “backup” system [6,7,8,9,10].  
In experimental systems, such as with flight test aircraft, the previously designed and certified production controller 
can serve as the reversionary system.   
The RTA monitor, decision logic, control mode switching code and the reversionary system are all, by definition, 
DTA’d subsystems since they must be trusted to provide protection from unknown errors in the untrusted advanced 
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system.  A runtime assured (RTA’d) system or subsystem is one which contains untrusted software that is 
monitored/protected by an RTA system.   
It should be noted that RTA protection covers both advanced system design flaws (validation) as well as software 
coding/implementation flaws (verification).  If either type of flaw or error causes the overall system to enter into an 
anomalous or unsafe state, then the RTA monitoring should detect this and activate the reversionary processes.   
There are two fundamental types of RTA systems: 
1. Safety-critical RTA systems: monitor system functions whose failure could lead to physical damage or result 
in catastrophic loss of the system.  This class of RTA systems is currently employed on turbofan engines and 
will be discussed later in the paper.   
2. Performance/mission-critical RTA systems: monitor system functions whose failure could result in 
performance degradation or reduced mission capabilities.  In such a case, the RTA system is more akin to a 
software integrity monitor, performing statistical diagnostics and other analyses to determine if the advanced 
system is operating as it should, delivering its stated performance.  Case studies of a performance critical RTA 
system are also presented later in this paper.   
Last, if the probability of hardware failures is considered sufficiently high enough to warrant inclusion of a 
hardware health monitor, then this hardware monitor should operate in an integrated fashion with the RTA system.  
Hardware faults can give rise to similar anomalous conditions as software errors in the advanced system being 
monitored by RTA.  Therefore, if hardware faults are detected, then this information needs to be passed to the RTA 
decision logic.  The RTA system must then make the determination whether to continue with the advanced system or 
revert to the reversionary system.  In some cases it is better to continue operation with the advanced system, especially 
if it has hardware fault adaptation capabilities.  Note that a hardware fault detection algorithm was not included in this 
study, as this was beyond the scope of the current effort.  For all the experiments presented, it was assumed that all 
hardware (actuators, sensors, turbomachinery, etc.) were working correctly.   
B. The Runtime Assured System Framework 
There are a number of variants to runtime monitoring or RTA frameworks.  A general RTA’d system framework 
is presented in Figure 1 below, inspired by the original work by Shaw [8] referred to as the Simplex framework. 
 
Figure 1. A General Form of a Runtime Assured System 
In the figure, input to the RTA protected block can come from upstream sources and from feedback from one or 
more downstream sources.  The advanced system and its output are untrusted.  The other blocks in the figure, which 
include the input allocator, the reversionary system, the RTA monitor and switch mechanism block, the plant being 
controlled and the hardware health monitor are all DTA’d subsystems.  All information flow into and out of the RTA’s 
system is considered trusted even when the output of the advanced system is passed through to the plant.  The claim 
here is that that output is trusted because it has been checked by the trusted RTA monitor.  Ultimately, the goal is to 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
4 
make a safety case argument that the RTA protected system is equivalent in terms of safety and correct operation to a 
system that is fully V&V’d at design time with accepted analysis/testing practices. 
III. RTA Protection Applied to a Turbofan Engine 
A. Introduction 
This section presents an initial investigation of RTA protection applied to a particular high fidelity turbofan engine 
model developed by NASA and its contractors known as the Commercial Modular Aero-Propulsion System 
Simulation 40k (C-MAPSS40k) [11,12].  This model was used to develop an advanced model-based engine control 
(MBEC) system for experimental study [13].  Since thrust cannot be directly measured, traditional engine control 
indirectly controls thrust through related parameters, such as fan speed or engine pressure ratio (EPR), which is the 
low pressure turbine discharge pressure P50 divided by the inlet pressure, P2.  However, NASA has developed a new 
approach whereby thrust is estimated using an Optimal Tuner Kalman Filter (OTKF) and this estimate is fed back to 
the controller, thereby directly controlling thrust.  The OTKF can self-tune to account for engine performance 
variations over its life cycle.  Feedback of the thrust estimate allows for tighter control of thrust over the life of the 
engine, which is not achievable using traditional control methods. The C-MAPSS40k simulation platform used in this 
study offers an EPR controller, a fan speed controller, and the MBEC OTKF controller as options for experimentation 
and development by researchers using this simulation platform.  Herein, the MBEC OTKF and its associated feedback 
of estimated thrust defines the advanced controller.  The EPR controller offered as part of the simulation package is 
used for the reversionary controller.   
Sensor information used by the controllers include fan and core speed, and temperatures and pressures measured 
throughout the engine.  The single control considered in this study is fuel flow rate.  The pilot’s throttle input is defined 
by the power lever angle (PLA).   
B. Runtime Assurance Integrated with Engine Protection Logic 
Turbofan engines continually operate near their physical limits (in terms of pressures, temperatures, rotation 
speeds, etc.).  Because of this, the turbofan engine control community has long employed engine protection logic that 
keeps the engine from exceeding such limits, especially during transient operation from one equilibrium point to the 
next.  The protection logic often engages to regulate the fuel flow rate during rapid changes in pilot PLA command 
input, which can cause transients in critical engine parameters related to structural health boundaries and flow 
dynamics through the engine. The engine protection function continually monitors the values of these parameters to 
determine if limit violations are ensuing.  If so, the protection logic regulates the fuel flow rate to ensure all allowable 
bounds defined for the set of critical parameters are not exceeded.  Engine protection will also engage during near-
idle conditions to ensure combustor blow-out does not occur.  Generally, the engine protection engagement is 
temporary and once the off-nominal conditions are mitigated or the engine settles out at a new equilibrium condition, 
then the fuel flow rate regulation becomes inactive.  In summary, engine protection logic ensures safe operating 
conditions by preventing the engine from operating in regions where either engine damage or unstable combustion 
and/or airflow through the engine can occur. 
It is key to note here that the engine protection system will often engage as a part of normal operations, regardless 
of whether an untrusted advanced controller is used, or a trusted reversionary controller is used.  Therefore, the current 
engine protection logic is defined here as the safety critical element in the overall RTA system, as this provides safety 
to the engine system.  No other safety critical RTA function is needed.  The engine protection system should operate 
its monitoring function at all times and take over fuel flow control when necessary, whether control is in advanced or 
reversionary mode.  Transient response performance is a critical factor to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
process for certifying aircraft engines. Therefore, design of the engine protection logic is key to certifying the overall 
engine system and improvements in the design of the engine protection logic is presented in Section V.   
Although the engine protection system provides the safety-critical RTA element, additional RTA functionality is 
required to determine if the advanced controller is operating incorrectly.  The other main current effort is development 
of RTA diagnostic methods that can make this determination.  The proposed diagnostic methods constitute the 
performance-critical part of the RTA system. Here, the RTA monitor continually executes diagnostic algorithms or 
other tests that can determine if the advanced controller is delivering its required performance or is instead operating 
in a degraded mode (irrespective of whether the engine protection logic is engaged). 
Development of RTA decision protocols is under current study by the authors.  It is proposed that performance 
maps or other criteria that define the expected performance of the trusted reversionary controller be constructed offline 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
5 
and then efficiently queried online to determine if the advanced controller is at least meeting the expected required 
performance of the reversionary controller.  If not, then this would trigger a control mode switch to the reversionary 
controller.  Such performance criteria could include response rise or settling times, or steady state EPR level versus 
PLA input, for example.  Case studies that compare EPR performance of the reversionary controller to the EPR 
performance delivered by the advanced controller are presented in the next section.  Other criteria may involve sensed 
temperatures or pressures at various engine stations.  These mappings would be a function of flight condition and 
would be interrogated online based on current sensor inputs. 
Other logic may analyze the requested fuel flow from the advanced controller if it triggers activation of the engine 
protection logic.  Parameters such as the rate or magnitude of the fuel flow command when the protection logic is 
activated may indicate whether an error is present in the advanced controller.  Even though the protection logic 
prevents any adverse effects from occurring, the software integrity of the advanced controller would be in question, 
triggering a switch to the trusted reversionary controller.  A case study of this scenario is presented in the next section. 
Fault detection and statistical change detection technologies may prove beneficial to determining more long term, 
subtle problems, such as in efficient fuel economy or higher than expected operating temperatures causing premature 
wear and tear to engine components.  Such algorithms would run continuously and draw statistical information from 
a running window of past engine state data and may be periodically analyzed offline during regular maintenance 
schedules.   
C. The Runtime Assured System Framework for the Turbofan Engine  
The framework for this architecture is presented in Figure 2.  The input to the system is shown to be the pilot’s 
PLA command.  The advanced and reversionary controllers are indicated to be the MBEC OTKF and EPR controllers 
respectively.  The RTA monitoring and switch block is expanded to show that it involves both the engine protection 
logic and associated fuel flow regulation for the safety-critical function as well as the RTA diagnostic function and 
switch mechanism that determines which control command is delivered to the engine.  The plant therefore receives 
one of three possible control commands, depending on the control mode determined by the RTA diagnostics: 
1. Advanced control mode – outputs of the MBEC OTKF controller are passed through to the plant. 
2. Reversionary control mode – outputs of the EPR controller are passed through to the plant. 
3. Fuel flow rate regulation mode – fuel flow rate is adjusted to ensure no critical parameter violates its upper 
or lower bound.   
 
Figure 2. Runtime Assured Engine Protection 
Note that the engine protection logic will be active at all times, continually determining if any critical parameter 
violation is ensuing.  The RTA diagnostic algorithm will also be continually active, collecting passed and current 
output information from certain defined channels and continuously running checks on that data to determine if the 
advanced controller is faulted in any way.  The reversionary controller should also be running at all times in “shadow 
mode,” even if the advanced controller has primary control of the engine system.  The objective of shadow mode 
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operation of the reversionary controller is to minimize transients or other control mode switching issues, such as 
integrator wind-up, etc.    
The next section provides case studies of the RTA system switching control from the advanced controller to the 
reversionary controller, demonstrating the performance-critical RTA function.  Following this, Section V focuses on 
engine protection logic design improvements, which again defines the safety-critical RTA function.  Engine protection 
logic can be overly conservative in keeping critical parameter values far from their respective limits, causing poor 
transient response characteristics.  Improving on the engine protection performance is an ongoing research focus at 
NASA and a proposed design procedure enhancement is presented in Section V.      
IV. RTA Case Studies 
This section presents experimental case studies resulting from initial investigations of a more general RTA 
decision function design methodology.  To narrow the studies, the authors reviewed literature pertaining to incidents 
resulting from engine malfunctions.  In Sallee et al., [14], for example, engine malfunction incidents, their causes, and 
flight conditions are tabulated and categorized for various types of aircraft engines.  From this article, it is evident that 
engine malfunction incidents are largely due to compressor surge at take-off flight conditions.  Loss of power, 
inappropriate crew responses, and hardware faults are other leading causes.  Therefore, case studies were narrowed to 
take-off flight conditions and to faults that would result in either compressor surge or reduction of power at takeoff.  
Criteria that could potentially be used to determine triggering a switch to the revisionary controller are also explored.    
All results that follow were obtained from the C-MAPSS40k engine simulation.  For each case study, the PLA 
was increased from a ground idle value (PLA = 40 deg.) to maximum take-off power value (PLA = 78 deg.), starting 
at 5 seconds and reaching the maximum value by 15 seconds.  This is considered a typical, not overtaxing power 
command scenario.   
Case 1. Nominal Baseline Results 
Figure 3 shows baseline simulation results for this case for the reversionary EPR controller.  The upper left hand 
plot shows the PLA time history, just described.  The upper right hand plot shows the fuel flow (Wf) rate command 
history.  Plotted as the blue line is the requested fuel flow (Wf Requested) from the EPR controller.  Plotted as the 
orange line is the fuel flow delivered (Wf Delivered) to the engine.  When these two lines differ, this indicates that the 
engine protection logic is activated.  It can be seen that these two lines only slightly differ between 5 and 15 seconds 
where the PLA changes, indicating that this is a rather benign case. 
The high pressure compressor (HPC) surge margin (SM) is plotted in the lower left plot in Figure 3.  Also plotted 
is the surge margin limit (SM Limit), defined for this case study as a constant 11%.  There are a number of different 
models for calculating surge margin.  The C-MAPSS40k developers have adopted the following, which is the Society 
of Automotive Engineers formulation: 
 
surge operating point
operating point
100
PR PR
SM
PR
 
   
 
  (1) 
The pressure ratios ( PR ) in this equation are specified at a constant corrected mass flow rate.  Note that the actual 
remaining surge margin is usually reduced due to a number of real world conditions, such as compressor blade heat 
transfer effects, variations in compressor tip clearance, debits due to normal engine deterioration, and debits due to 
engine-to-engine variations.  These effects are not included in these studies, although they are modeled in the C-
MAPSS40k simulation and can be considered in higher fidelity studies.  
Last, the lower right hand plot in Figure 3 presents the net engine thrust in pounds.  It can be seen that there is a 
significant delay in achieving the requested power, with a 90% rise time of the final thrust value not being achieved 
until approximately 17 seconds (3 to 4 seconds after the 90% rise time of the max PLA value). 
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Figure 3. EPR Controller Simulation Results for Take-Off Power Command 
Figure 4 shows the analogous results for the nominal (no errors) advanced MBEC OTKF controller.  The PLA 
history is the same as shown in Figure 3.  The requested fuel flow, however, is substantially different, with a much 
more aggressive rise. The requested fuel flow was limited by the protection logic during the PLA change at 
approximately 6 to 7 seconds due to the acceleration schedule limit in the engine protection logic.  This limit is 
discussed more in Section V.  Note that the requested fuel flow was also limited to a maximum value in steady state, 
due to reaching one or more of the structural upper-bound limits in the engine protection logic. These limits are also 
discussed more in Section V.  As expected, the surge margin is generally lower than that of the EPR controller, and 
even exhibited a small, short limit violation at around 6 seconds near where the maximum core acceleration occurs.  
This demonstrates the less conservative nature of this engine controller over that of the EPR controller.  The engine 
thrust response performance is seen to be improved over that obtained by the EPR controller, with a 90% rise time 
achieved at approximately 10 seconds. This demonstrates a substantial performance improvement over the EPR 
controller. 
 
Figure 4. Nominal MBEC OTKF Controller Simulation Results for Take-Off Power Command 
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Case 2. Seeded Fault during PLA Transient - Increase in Requested Fuel Flow 
For the first error case, a number of large step increases were introduced to the fuel flow command generated by 
the advanced MBEC controller during (and after) the transient region where the PLA command is increased from idle 
to maximum takeoff value.  The results of this case are shown in Figure 5.  Here, the large step commands in the 
requested fuel flow from the MBEC controller are shown in the fuel flow history plot.  Without engine protection, 
these faults would have caused immediate HPC surge, shutting down engine operations.  However, it can be seen that 
the engine protection logic very effectively arrests these faulted commands and the resulting engine operations are 
largely the same as that shown in the nominal case with no errors in the advanced controller.  If the RTA diagnostics 
do not analyze the fuel flow command history from the MBEC controller, then this case would go unnoticed.  This 
points to the fact that even though the engine protection provides safe, stable combustion, the fuel flow commands 
generated by the advanced controller should still be analyzed in some manner by the RTA monitor function.   
 
Figure 5. Error in MBEC OTKF Controller – Fuel Flow Increases during PLA Transient  
 
Case 3. Seeded Fault during Steady State - Linear Reduction in Requested Fuel Flow 
Since the engine protection logic will arrest large increases in fuel flow command, an error that would not activate 
the engine protection logic was sought.  Here, a simulated fault causing a linear reduction in the fuel flow command 
generated by the MBEC controller was introduced during the steady state conditions after the peak engine thrust was 
achieved.  This case is shown in Figure 6.  The PLA history plot is no longer shown here, as it is the same as shown 
in the last three figures.  The upper left plot shows the fuel flow command history and it can be seen that there is a 
linear reduction in commanded fuel flow starting at 15 seconds.  The key here is that this reduced value in fuel flow 
causes the engine protection to shut off (the commanded fuel flow neither triggers an upper bound limit nor a lower 
bound limit of any of the critical parameters).  Therefore, this error is allowed to continue.  The upper right plot shows 
the surge margin history and it can be seen that, as expected, the surge margin increases during the phase when the 
fuel flow is reduced.   
The lower left plot shows an example of an RTA check that might prove useful in this case.  Here, the EPR history 
is plotted.  The suggested RTA trigger or switching condition is also indicated in this plot.  If the EPR achieved by 
the advanced MBEC controller falls below 90% of the expected steady state EPR achieved by the EPR controller (at 
this PLA value and flight condition), then the RTA system switches operation to the reversionary EPR controller.  
This occurs at approximately 24 seconds.  A value of 90% is used to account for model uncertainty, environmental 
variations, sensor noise, etc.  That is, to prevent false alarm switches, the RTA switching condition should not be 
overly sensitive and switch at say, 98% or 99% of the EPR controller value.  The actual switching condition is design 
dependent.  The recovery in pressure ratio and net thrust after the switch occurs at 24 seconds is evident in the bottom 
two plots in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Error in MBEC OTKF Controller – Fuel Flow Decreases Linearly During Steady State 
Case 4. Seeded Fault during PLA Transient – Sluggish Response in MBEC Controller 
Perhaps a more troublesome error that could occur that also does not trigger activation of the engine protection 
logic would be if the advanced MBEC controller produced a sluggish response at takeoff.  This error was introduced 
by inserting a second order low pass filter at the output of the MBEC controller. This causes rapid increases in 
commanded fuel flow to be attenuated, causing the sluggish thrust output performance.  This filter also attenuates the 
steady state magnitude of the commanded fuel flow, causing further performance issues.  This case is shown in Figure 
7.  It can be seen that after 5 seconds, the fuel flow command from the MBEC controller is never adjusted by the 
engine protection logic.  The surge margin is also seen to be much larger than the nominal case, which indicates a 
lower thrust output.  The engine thrust response can be seen to be quite benign compared to the rapid response seen 
in the nominal case.   
The lower left plot in this case also shows an example of an RTA check that might prove useful.  Again, the EPR 
history is plotted.  The suggested RTA trigger or switching condition indicated in this plot is when the EPR achieved 
by the MBEC controller falls below the EPR achieved by the EPR controller during the transient.  The slopes of the 
EPR responses may also be analyzed, indicating a much faster rise time achieved by the EPR controller over that 
achieved by the MBEC controller.  Clearly a loss of performance is indicated here.  This switch would be triggered at 
15 seconds into the run. 
Figure 8 shows the corrected responses achieved by the RTA system switching to the reversionary EPR controller 
at the trigger time of 15 seconds.  The fuel flow command immediately increases to its proper value, resulting in 
immediate recovery of the EPR and net engine thrust responses. 
A key observation seen in both Case 3 and Case 4 is that when the RTA system switches to the reversionary 
controller, the responses show a very smooth transition, absent of any transients, overshoots, control bumps or other 
control mode switching issues.  It is believed that this is the case because the reversionary EPR controller is being run 
in “shadow mode,” generating control solutions at each step in response to the current state generated by the active 
advanced MBEC controller.  Therefore, when it is commanded to take over operations, its initial conditions are aligned 
with the current engine and controller states.   
In summary, these case studies show the benefits of RTA monitoring and checking of expected engine 
performance.  Erroneous engine responses can occur even when engine protection logic is in place to arrest unsafe 
conditions.  Here, such errors in the advanced controller can potentially cause drastic reduction in engine performance 
which, even if the engine combustion dynamics remain stable, can cause dangerous conditions to the flight vehicle 
itself.  This is because if the pilot is expecting a certain level of thrust response performance and the error in the 
advanced controller prevents the engine from achieving its required or expected performance, then this can lead to a 
number of safety critical scenarios depending on how the pilot responds to the faulted engine. 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
10 
 
Figure 7. Error in MBEC OTKF Controller – Sluggish Response during Takeoff 
 
Figure 8. Error in MBEC OTKF Controller – Sluggish Response during Takeoff Corrected by RTA 
V. Improvements in Engine Protection Logic Design 
This section presents a novel design approach for improving the tracking performance of the engine protection 
logic.  To provide more background, the current engine protection logic is first discussed in more detail than in Section 
III.  Next, an overview of the design challenge is presented, followed by background on the new design approach 
known as Iterative Feedback Tuning (IFT).  Experimental results of using the IFT design method are also presented 
in this section, showing the benefits of this approach. 
A. Engine Protection Logic Background 
The Min-Max protection logic, depicted in Figure 9, is a widely accepted feature of engine control for commercial 
systems. Again, in the C-MAPSS40k simulation, the user can choose one of three controller options –EPR, fan speed, 
or the advanced MBEC OTKF controller.  Depending on the chosen controller, the pilot’s “throttle input,” or PLA 
command, is converted to either an EPR, fan speed, or estimated thrust command, which is then mapped to a fuel flow 
rate command to track the chosen feedback signal.  The protection logic uses feedback of critical sensed parameters 
to ensure that the regulated fuel flow rate command does not cause these critical parameters to exceed specified limits. 
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The parameters that are limited are listed in Table 1.  The fan speed, core speed, burner pressure and exhaust 
temperature are all upper-bound limited for structural considerations.  Exceedances of these limits could result in 
mechanical or structural component failures. These are generally considered to be steady-state limits. The core 
acceleration schedule is upper-bound limited for operational considerations.   This parameter indicates the remaining 
surge margin in the HPC.  An exceedance of this limit can cause compressor stall during rapid changes in commanded 
thrust. This is generally considered a transient limit that is active during rapid changes in thrust but is not a 
consideration once the engine settles at the new commanded thrust.  The two lower-bound limits are also for 
operational considerations and become active when there is not enough fuel flow requested by the controller to 
maintain stable combustion at the current operational state. 
 
Figure 9. Engine Protection Logic and Fuel Flow Limit Control 
Table 1. Critical Parameter Limits in the Engine Protection Logic 
Parameter Description Bound Type Engine Control Limit Type 
fN  Fan speed Max Structural 
cN  Core speed Max Structural 
3SP  Burner inlet static pressure Max Structural 
50T  Exhaust temperature Max Structural 
c cN N  
Acceleration schedule Max Operational – compressor surge 
3SP  Burner inlet static pressure Min Operational - combustor lean-blow out  
3f sw P  Ratio Units, RU Min Operational - flight idle operation 
 
The upper bounding, lower bounding and min/max blocks shown in Figure 9 are not simply attenuation functions 
but include control laws, anti-windup logic, lookup tables and other functions – all designed so that, when active, the 
protection logic tracks the active limit as close as possible for performance considerations.  The protection logic uses 
integral control to calculate the fuel flow rate required so that none of the parameter limits are violated. The closer a 
parameter comes to its limit, the lower the fuel flow rate allowed for that parameter.  
The logic flow displayed in Figure 9 is as follows.  First, a distinct fuel flow rate is calculated for each of the 
parameters listed in the upper bounding block that ensures each respective upper bound is not violated.  These fuel 
flow rate values are then compared against the requested fuel flow rate from the controller. The minimum of all of 
these values is then passed to the next step in the protection logic. That is, the fuel flow rate value generated by the 
‘Min’ block is either: (1) the requested fuel flow from the active controller if it is less than any of the maximum 
allowable values calculated in the upper bounding block, or (2) the minimum fuel flow value required so that no upper-
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bound limit is exceeded.  This fuel flow rate value is then delivered to the ‘Max’ block and compared to the lower-
bound limits generated by the lower bounding block.  If it is greater than the lower bounds, then this value is delivered 
to the engine as the fuel flow command, (wf_Cmd).  Otherwise, the maximum fuel flow required so that no lower-
bound limit is violated is delivered to the engine.  Further details on the engine protection logic design can be found 
in [11,12]. 
B. Design Problem Overview 
It is well understood that the engine protection logic results in a very conservative design, which can limit engine 
performance, especially through active transient operations.  A preliminary approach was developed by May, et al., 
[15], in which the engine protection is made conditionally active (CA) only when operating near a parameter limit to 
help reduce this conservatism.  Although increased performance can be obtained by this method, it was noted that the 
design required significant tuning and the CA limiter bounds were empirically determined in an ad hoc fashion.  It 
was noted more “research needs to be done to develop a more rigorous analytical approach to provide guidelines for 
the selection of these bounds.”    
Based on NASA’s desire to further mature the CA limit regulators and improve the engine protection logic by 
reducing its conservatism, the current CA design presented in May, et al. [15] was investigated.  However, rather than 
maturing or augmenting the CA approach, the original protection logic design (i.e., without CA limiting) was assessed 
to determine if it could be improved.  Detailed studies of the acceleration limiter revealed that poor tuning of the 
protection logic controller was the source of the conservative response in this channel, limiting the engine 
performance.  However, PI controllers can be difficult to tune for nonlinear systems, specifically when undergoing 
large transients which exceed any linear operating range. Furthermore small changes in the gains can have substantial 
impact on the performance. 
Therefore, instead of manually attempting to tune the proportional-integral (PI) feedback gains in the acceleration 
tracking controller, the IFT design technique was used, which is an innovative method of automatically tuning 
controllers assuming no knowledge of the underlying model [16,17]. The IFT method is a theoretically rigorous, robust 
algorithm capable of optimizing control gains for arbitrary control architectures without requiring an explicit equation 
for the plant. While the underlying theory and convergence of the algorithm is proved for linear systems, it can be 
applied to nonlinear systems as well. However the strength of the convergence proofs no longer applies and 
modifications to the implementation may, in general, be required to achieve desired improvements. 
The IFT algorithm was implemented for the acceleration limiter logic and executed in a loop spanning a range of 
altitude and Mach conditions. The subsequent set of optimal PI gains resulted in reduced conservatism and greatly 
improved engine response during transient responses over a wide range of altitude and Mach values. It is proposed 
that these optimized gains replace the original fixed PI gain values in the engine initialization scripts. The entire 
optimization process is automated and no operator tuning is required to generate the new set of gains.  This approach 
was also investigated for the other channels shown in the upper and lower bounding blocks in Figure 9.  However, the 
approach was found to only improve the design in the acceleration limiter, as this was the most problematic channel.      
C. Derivation of the IFT Algorithm  
Optimized tracking control objectives can be quantified by a generic cost function parameterized by tracking 
error, regardless of the specific control architecture. General optimization solutions require a mathematical model of 
the plant and a specified control structure. However, the optimization process itself often determines the structure of 
the controller. If the plant is too complex to be modeled mathematically, or the plant is unknown, or there is a 
prescribed control structure, then optimization is typically achieved by iterative gradient-based minimization.  For the 
acceleration tracking problem it is desired to maintain the existing PI control architecture and obtain the best possible 
tracking performance. Iterative optimization procedures are often inhibited by either complicated or unknown 
gradients of the controlled plant with respect to the optimization parameters (i.e., the control gains). It was shown by 
Hjalmarsson, et al. in [16] that the gradient can be computed directly from the plant input-output signals using specially 
constructed closed-loop experiments with the controller operating in-the-loop. Once the gradient has been 
experimentally determined, the tracking cost function can be minimized using standard Gauss-Newton iterations. For 
a single-degree-of-freedom controller, such as a PI controller, only two closed-loop experiments are required at each 
iteration step. The first experiment consists of collecting data under normal operating conditions with the controller 
operating in-the-loop with the plant. The second experiment uses a specially designed reference input to the controller 
based on outputs from the first experiment and inspires the name iterative feedback tuning. The scheme does not 
require model identification and can be applied to process systems running online to improve performance.  
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The theory of the IFT method presented here was initially presented by Hjalmarsson, et al. in [17]. The original 
presentation treats a more general two-degree-of-freedom controller with disturbances. The presentation here is 
simplified to consider single-degree-of-freedom controllers that are a function of combined tracking error, like a 
proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller and also ignores disturbances. 
Assume the following unknown system and single-degree-of-freedom controller:  
 
0t ty G u  (2) 
 ( )( )t t tu C r y   (3) 
It is assumed that the controller, C, has a defined structure and is parameterized by a set of tuning parameters, . 
For example, C could represent a PID controller, parameterized by the control gains, . It is apparent that for the 
closed-loop system, both the output and input are functions of the target control parameters, . The closed-loop 
tracking error can be defined as 
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The desired output response 
dy  is defined by some filter applied to the reference input and the closed-loop transfer 
function is defined as 
0T .  In order to minimize the tracking error, an optimization cost function can be defined in 
terms of the summed square of the tracking error over some number of samples, N, of a simulation run and weighted 
by the squared control effort, 
tu : 
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For this application, weighting on the control signal was not addressed for the controller optimization so the cost 
function is simplified as shown. The goal of the algorithm is to determine the set of controller parameters, , which 
minimize the objective function, ( )J  . The objective function is minimized (locally) when its gradient is zero. So 
the Gauss-Newton iteration procedure is to determine the gradient of the cost function 
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and iterate the control parameters until they satisfy the criteria for the minimum of the function 
  (8) 
where the iteration step size, , for the ith step, controls the convergence rate for the control parameters. The update 
direction at the ith iteration step, iR , is specified by the user. However, the update direction is typically selected as a 
Gauss-Newton approximation of the Hessian of the objective function, J, which is defined as 
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Where the control effort is not included in the current definition of the cost function. Since it’s assumed that the 
process cannot be modeled as a mathematical function, the gradients must be computed from the process (or 
simulation) outputs. Using the closed-loop transfer function, T0 the gradient of the tracking error can be defined as 
1
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and, 
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Therefore the tracking error gradient can be computed by multiplying the reciprocal of the controller by the 
gradient of the control with respect to the tuning parameters by the closed-loop transfer function acting on the input 
signal (r-y). This immediately reveals the required process experiments to determine the solution gradient which is 
broken into two steps.  
1. For the ith iteration, a simulation is run for a fixed number of samples, N, with the candidate controller. The 
input signal is the reference input, r, and the output is the nominal closed-loop response 
1y . 
2. A second simulation is run for the same number of samples, N, with the same candidate controller. However, 
the input signal is now the reference input, r, minus the nominal closed-loop response,
1y , obtained from the 
first experiment. Therefore the input is 
1( )r y  
The output of these two experiments explicitly define the tracking error gradient without requiring any knowledge 
of the specific plant:  
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This treatment is greatly simplified due to the single-degree-of-freedom controller and the control input not being 
weighted in the cost function. From experiment #1 the tracking error is explicitly defined as 
   1 1  t dy y y y r      (13) 
where the desired response, yd, is simply the reference input. Using Eqs. (12) and (13), the gradient of the cost function 
is now computed according to Eq. (7), the update direction according to Eq. (9), and the control parameters are iterated 
according to Eq. (8).  
D. Implementation of the IFT Algorithm  
Conservatism in the tracking response can be reduced by improving the control gains within the existing engine 
protection logic. The design goal is to maintain the existing tracking control architecture and optimize the gains. In 
order to apply the IFT algorithm to the engine protection logic, it has to be specified for a discrete PI control 
architecture. The discrete PI controller takes the form 
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where, 
 ,p iK K     (15) 
The simulation experiments are setup by modifying the C-MAPSS40k model to create a unique test platform. 
The full nonlinear simulation was modified to start the PLA step change at time 0 so that the acceleration transient 
would be applied during the initial portion of the simulation to simplify data collection. The simulation was also 
modified so that the acceleration limiter was always active. The baseline EPR controller and the other protection logic 
channels were bypassed. By forcing the engine to respond only to fuel flow commands only from the acceleration 
limiter, there was no min-max control signal switching which would corrupt the algorithm progression. As a desirable 
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by-product, this also caused the anti-windup logic for the acceleration limiter integral control to become disabled. The 
final test of the optimized control gains was performed on the unmodified simulation with both the baseline controller 
and full protection logic active. The acceleration controller was modified to include an auxiliary reference input to 
collect data for the gradient calculation. For experiment #1 the auxiliary reference input was set to zero and the total 
reference input to the controller was the nominal acceleration schedule, r. The output of experiment #1 was the nominal 
closed-loop output data,
1y , which is the sensed engine acceleration. For experiment #2 the same simulation model 
was used but the auxiliary reference input was set to the output data from experiment #1. Therefore the total reference 
input for experiment #2 was the nominal acceleration schedule, r, minus the nominal output data from experiment #1, 
1y , the original closed-loop acceleration response. The output of experiment #2, 2y , is the closed-loop transfer 
function acting on the tracking error signal: 
0 1( )T r y , which is used to compute the tracking error gradient. 
In order to compute the tracking error gradient, total objective function gradient, and search direction, a distinct 
‘gradient simulation’ was created to implement the filter defined by Eq. (12), where Eq. (14) defines the controller. 
The tracking error in Eq. (13) was incorporated in the gradient simulation using the N-length input and output signals 
from the two experiments. 
E. Results of the IFT Algorithm  
While the internal optimization experiments were performed using the modified simulations, the following results 
correspond to the full, unmodified nonlinear C-MAPSS40k simulation executed at Sea-Level Static Conditions (Mach 
= 0, Alt = 0) with a step change in PLA from 44 to 80 at time zero. The nominal system response in Figure 10  shows 
poor closed-loop tracking of the acceleration limiter.  Figure 11 shows the corresponding fuel flow rates comparing 
the EPR control effort with the acceleration limiter logic control effort. The perforated line indicates which of the two 
control signals is sent to the engine. The protection logic selects the smallest fuel flow magnitude so the acceleration 
limiter fuel flow rate is initially sent to the engine but at approximately 2.2 seconds, the EPR fuel flow rate falls below 
the acceleration limiter control effort and the output changes to the EPR control signal. This corresponds to the bounds 
in Figure 10defining the period of the transient response where the acceleration limiter is active. When the acceleration 
limiter logic goes inactive, acceleration tracking is not expected because the engine control signal is designated for 
another priority, in this case the baseline EPR tracking. Fuel flow rates are not shown for the remaining response 
iterations because the active limit bounds in the tracking response clearly indicate when the acceleration limit logic 
produces less fuel than the EPR control and is the active channel.     
  
Figure 10. Nominal Acceleration Tracking Figure 11. Nominal Fuel Flow Rate 
The IFT optimization was performed with a step size of  = 0.1 for an incremental number of iterations. The PI 
control parameters were initialized to their nominal fixed values of 
pK = 0.001823 and iK = 0.003682 defined in the 
C-MAPSS40k model.  After five iterations of the control parameter optimization, the response improved as shown in 
Figure 12.  The associated decrease in tracking error cost and the evolution of the proportional and integral gains are 
shown in Figure 13, Figure 14, and Figure 15, respectively. 
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Figure 12. Tracking Response - 5 Iterations Figure 13. Tracking Error Cost - 5 Iterations 
  
Figure 14. Proportional Gain - 5 Iterations Figure 15. Integral Gain - 5 Iterations 
After fifteen iterations of the control parameter optimization, the response improved as shown in Figure 16.  The 
associated decrease in tracking error cost and the evolution of the proportional and integral gains are shown in, Figure 
17, Figure 18, and Figure 19, respectively. While the tracking performance is obviously improved with the new gains, 
neither the tracking cost nor the PI control gains appear to have converged. 
After twenty-five iterations of the control parameter optimization, the response improved substantially as shown 
in Figure 20. The associated decrease in tracking error cost and the evolution of the proportional and integral gains 
are shown in, Figure 21, Figure 22, and Figure 23, respectively. The tracking performance is greatly improved using 
the new gains.  In addition, the tracking cost appears to be converging as well as the integral gain term. However the 
proportional term has not converged. Nonetheless, twenty-five iterations was adopted as the convergence point for the 
acceleration limiter when the algorithm was applied across a range of Mach and Altitude numbers.  
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Figure 16. Tracking Response - 15 Iterations Figure 17. Tracking Error Cost - 15 Iterations 
  
Figure 18. Proportional Gain - 15 Iterations Figure 19. Integral Gain - 15 Iterations 
  
Figure 20. Tracking Response - 25 Iterations Figure 21. Tracking Error Cost - 25 Iterations 
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Figure 22. Proportional Gain - 25 Iterations Figure 23. Integral Gain - 25 Iterations 
To ensure convergence of the algorithm, the optimization was run for 100 iterations to observe the change in the 
tracking response and the evolution of the tracking error cost and the optimal control gains. The tracking response in 
Figure 24 is slightly worse than the twenty-five iteration case which corresponds to the slight uptick in the tracking 
error cost in Figure 25 as the objective function converges. The proportional control gain in Figure 26 and the integral 
control gain in Figure 27 both attain their converged values. However, this response might be considered ‘over tuned’ 
and the initial minimum of the tracking error cost is a better metric in determining when to stop the gain iteration. As 
previously stated, the twenty-five iteration case is selected as the ideal response. 
  
Figure 24. Tracking Response - 100 Iterations Figure 25. Tracking Error Cost - 100 Iterations 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
19 
  
Figure 26. Proportional Gain - 100 Iterations Figure 27. Integral Gain - 100 Iterations 
 
Table 2 summarizes the optimization results using the IFT method. It indicates that the substantial changes in the 
integral control were most influential on reducing the cost. Table 2 also shows the ‘over tuning’ corresponding to the 
increase in cost going from twenty-five up to 100 iterations. 
Table 2. Iterated Optimization Results 
Iteration Cost (J x 104) Proportional Gain (Kp x 10-3 ) Integral Gain (Ki x 10-3) 
0 1.85 182 368 
5 1.42 198 758 
15 1.11 206 1111 
25 1.01 237 1293 
100 1.05 329 1413 
 
F. IFT Application to Varying Environmental Conditions  
The IFT algorithm was executed in a loop covering a range of altitude and Mach conditions to evaluate how well 
the automatic tuning worked over a range of environmental conditions. The same PLA step change was applied at 
time 0 for each evaluation case. Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30 show the improved tracking response 
corresponding to 25 IFT iterations for a range of altitude and Mach conditions.   
  
Figure 28. Acceleration Tracking Response – Alt = 10k feet Mach = 0.4  
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Figure 29. Acceleration Tracking Response – Alt = 10k feet Mach = 0.8  
 
Figure 30. Acceleration Tracking Response – Alt = 20k feet Mach = 0.6  
Table 3 shows the optimal integral gain matrix corresponding to variations in altitude and Mach. There is a 
maximum 15% change in the integral gain which indicates that scheduling over a range of altitude and Mach values 
might not be necessary for achieving improved response. However, each of these cases was run with a fixed number 
of 25 iterations. If an intelligent iteration stop was implemented based on achieving the minimum tracking error cost, 
then improved performance might be attained corresponding to a larger spread in the integral gain values. 
Table 3. Integral Gain, Ki Matrix ( x 10-3) 
Altitude (x 1000 ft) M = 0 M = 0.2 M = 0.4 M = 0.6 M = 0.8 
0 127 127 129 137 X 
10 140 139 135 136 144 
20 X X X 147 145 
 
G. IFT Modifications for Acceleration Limiter  
The IFT algorithm requires a fixed number of samples to perform the cost computations. Initially, this was 
selected as the entire length of the acceleration ramp-up due to the PLA step change. However, this did not result in 
convergence of the algorithm. This is undoubtedly tied to the nonlinearity of the system. A modified form of the IFT 
algorithm allows the cost functions to be computed over a selected range of the closed-loop simulation time. A ‘mask’ 
of length 0t  is defined as 
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where the cost function is summed from sample 
0  to t t t N   instead of 1 to t t N  . The mask is generally used 
to bypass the transient response in order to focus the control parameter degrees of freedom on the steady-state 
response. However, for the acceleration limiter, it was found that setting the mask to the initial portion of the ramp 
response resulted in excellent convergence. Therefore for the current implementation, all summations are performed 
over 1 to ft t t   where ft  is the designated mask length. Several mask lengths were tested before settling on the 
final value of 
ft = 80 samples. Each experiment was run for the same total number of samples, N, which covered the 
entire acceleration ramp. However, the cost computations were only summed over 1 to 80t t  . The implications of 
the limited mask are an area for future research. 
VI. Conclusions 
This work focused on integration of a runtime assurance (RTA) framework into an existing advanced turbofan 
engine control system.  One part of the RTA system is defined as the set of logic and decision functions required to 
determine if observed anomalous conditions are due to errors in the advanced controller.  Construction of a general 
method to perform such checks is ongoing, but it is proposed here that the RTA monitoring and decision functions 
query performance maps and other functions online to determine if the advanced controller is at least delivering the 
expected performance that can be achieved by the trusted reversionary controller.  To demonstrate this idea, a set of 
experiments were performed comparing expected engine pressure ratio (EPR) responses from the reversionary 
controller to what was achieved by the advanced controller.  It was shown that when the EPR performance did not 
meet defined minimum standards, the RTA system switched operations to the reversionary controller. These 
experiments also showed that smooth transitions from the advanced controller to the reversionary controller occurred 
automatically when it was deemed that the advanced controller was not operating correctly.  This was largely due to 
the reversionary controller being run in “shadow mode” while the advance controller was active.  This helped to 
alleviate transients and other control mode switching issues. 
The other main part of the RTA system is defined to be its safety critical function.  Engine protection logic, which 
already exists within the turbofan engine control system, was determined to fill this role.  However, the current design 
of the protection logic is considered conservative and improvement in its tracking performance is desired.  To address 
this problem, the iterative feedback tuning (IFT) algorithm was employed to determine optimal control gains over a 
range of Mach and altitude values.  A matrix of optimal proportional-integral (PI) feedback gains was constructed to 
cover this range of environmental conditions and resulted in greatly improved engine core acceleration tracking at all 
operating conditions tested.  A major advantage of the IFT approach is that improved performance is attained without 
modifying the existing protection logic control structure.  Therefore, no additional burden is added to the certification 
process for this well-established protection methodology.  
A key result of this investigation is that the benefits of RTA technology are evident for protecting engine systems 
with untrusted advanced controllers.  Turbofan engines have a clearly defined, finite set of physical and performance 
limit constraints that define the operating envelope and make developing an RTA system quite feasible.  The 
constraints are defined for measurable parameters such as fan and compressor speeds, and temperatures and pressures 
at various stages through the engine.  Safe operation and meeting performance requirements can therefore be clearly 
defined and checked by the RTA system.  This is in contrast to other RTA applications involving systems with 
complex, multi-dimensional operating envelopes and complex definitions of safety.  In such cases, successful RTA 
designs can be difficult to achieve and quite complex.   
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